Abstract-An aqueous solo :ion oi enricllec: anium i. z,lvertently flowed into a 55 gal drum in a process area in Oak Ridge in June 1958, estabiishmg a prompt-critical neutron chain reaction in which about 101s fissions occurred before the system finally became subcritical by the addition of water.
been reported fully elsewhere,c3) was an important experience in applied health physics since the primary and immediate concern was an evaluation of personnel exposure to penetrating * Operated for the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission by Union Carbide Nuclear Company. radiation and the establishment of necessary remedial measures.
A study of the health physics problems and of the medical findings will be presented in subsequent papers in a series of which this is the first. The cause of the accident and an analysis of it from a reactor physics viewpoint, both of which are discussed in this paper, are of less overall importance except as they aid in establishing the radiation levels to which personnel may have been exposed. Therefore, only a brief description Jf the cause and a review of what is believed co be the sequence of events leading first to the critical condition within the solution and .: final return to subcritical are presented here. One plausible reactor physics analysis of the power excursion is also considered.
DESCRIPTION
AND ANALYSIS The nuclear accident occurred in an area in which salvable enriched uranium (m9Oo/o U235) is recovered from various materials by physicochemical methods in a complex of equipment.
This recovery process was being remodeled at the time, and the situation was The latter required disassembly, cleaning, reassembly and leak testing of certain pieces of equipment, particularly several long 5 in. diameter pipes used for storage of aqueous solutions of U335 whose shape and dimensions prevent the establishment of nuclear chain reactions.
The leak testing operation consisted in filling the pipes with water from a 55 gal stainless steel drum (approximately 22 in. in diameter and 33 in. high), observing the joints in the system and subsequently draining the water back into the same drum. These inventory procedures extended over several days and it was not possible or economic to schedule them concurrently throughout the several stages of the salvage train. As a matter of fact, operations had been re-established in the step immediately ahead of the scene of the accident some hours prior to its occurrence and a part of the bank of storage pipes in question had been leak tested a few days previously.
As a consequence of both this time factor and irregularities in the function and operation of some valves, a quantity of solution was inadvertently transferred from the area already in operation into the one still undergoing leak testing. Further, this transfer was into one of the 5 in. diameter pipes which had already been tested. It has been established subsequently that the flow pattern from these pipes into the drum intended to receive the leak-test water was such that the accumulated solution preceded the water.
The dimensions of the drum and the concentration of the solution permitted the system to become critical.
The reaction was terminated sometime later by the inflow of a relatively larger volume of the water believed to have been the only liquid present in the system.
A photograph of the drum in the position occupied during the accident is shown in Fig. 1 .
A specification of the manner and rate of establishment of the neutron chain reaction system, the determination of the time which elapsed between its first becoming critical and its final return to subcritical together with the power pattern within this interval, and the mechanism by which the nuclear reaction was This selection is justified by these factors: the reactor analysis which has been made, based on these initial conditions, yields a time interval consistent with what is believed to be the observed duration of the excursion, and the assumed critical height agrees both with the liquid level estimated in the drum by the individual standing nearby at. the time of the first indication of a reaction and with the distribution of induced activity in the walls of the drum described below.
If it is assumed that the concentration of the solution subsequently added to the drum was uniform and that the volume in the drum reached 180 1. when the entire 2.5 kg of U235 had bekn transferred, the mass-volume relation in the drum is described by the straight line on the plot. It is recognized that this simplifying assumption is somewhat unrealistic and overestimates the time interval between delayed and prompt critical.
It does, however, provide a lower limit to the reactivity available as a function of time. The details of the analysis are given in the Appendix and the results are in Table 1 . The reactivity as a function of the solution height in the drum and of the time after delayed critical is shown in Fig. 3 and of the neutron reflection by the concrete floor, located approximately 3 in below the drum, were somewhat compensating and have been neglected.
The bases for, and the results of, the above analysis are also not inconsistent with the following additional significant observations. cross the wind from the scene of the accident. Fig. 4 is a reproduction of its output recorded during that time.
The following discussion is based on a ~7 enlargement of this record, although most of the points are discernible on the reproductions shown here. The radiation intensity is observed first to have increased extremely rapidly from point (a), driving the pen off scale, to have decreased to point (b), and then to have repeated the sequence to point (c), all in about 15 set as determined by the chart drive speed. During the next interval, the signal oscillated an indeterminate number of times, finally decreasing to about five times background 2.8 min after the first rise in level. The upper and lower limits of some of these pulses, discernible on the enlarged trace, are indicated by tl and I, respectively. This (average) high-intensity field was then followed by a slowly decreasing level of some 18 min duration, again characterized by pulses. One peak, at 61 on the scale, is separated inordinately in time from adjacent portions of the trace and may be due to a momentary peculiarity of this detector, particularly since it is not readily identified on the charts from either of the air monitorsreferred to below. Although thisneutron detector is equipped with two sensitivity ranges (25 and 125 mr/hr, full scale, respectively), it is believed to have remained on the more sensitive scale during the entire period, discounting the inference that some of the discontinuities are due to scale changes.
An enlargement, Fig. 5 , of a section of the chart reproduced in Fig. 4 illustrates qualitatively the power pulses which occurred during the extended period of relatively lower activity.
The overall duration of the excursion' is shown by this trace to have been 21 min. The absence of a strong neutron field within the drum as it initially became critical may mean that the critical height was reached prior to the initial energy release, that is, even though the system was critical, it did not manifest itself until it was "triggered" at a low power level, in a statistical manner, by ambient neutrons. This dormant period may have been a few tens of seconds, well within the accuracy of the above estimate.
Two additional radiation monitoring instruments were operating during the time of interest, both being air samplers which detect the y-radiation from particulates collected on a filter surrounding a Geiger tube. Figs. 6 and 7 are copies of the records from these instruments.
Each chart shows the direct radiation from the excursion and, subsequently, the arrival of the air-borne activity. The differences in theinterval between the detection of.these two activities at the two locations, about 12 min and 48 min, respectively, can be qualitatively correlated with the recorded wind direction at that time.
The former was down-wind from the accident. The latter was located in an area adjacent to the site of the detector discussed above, i.e. cross wind from the accident, so the delay in the arrival of air-borne activity is expected to be comparable and equal to about Q hr. This observation is presented as evidence favoring the interpretation of the extended, low-level activity shown in Figs There are a number of undocumented observations made with portable radiation detection instruments in the vicinity of the accident to the effect that the radiation level remained constant for times of from 5 to 15 min, which is at least supporting evidence that the source of radiation was extended in time.
Analysis of induced activity in the drum wall Activity was induced by neutrons in the components of the stainless steel of which the drum was constructed. Analyses of these activities yield at least relative values of the neutron exposure and, hence, of the neutron flux at various elevations along the side of the drum.
The fast neutron measure was derived from the activity of Co58 arising in the NP(,, @) Co58 reaction.
The thermal neutrons were evaluated from the Cr51 activity from the Cr50 (72, y) Cr51 reaction.
(An analysis of the steel showed that it contained 17.99 and 11.84 wt y0 chromium and nickel, respectively.) The activation data are recorded in Table 2 It is interesting to note that the ma,ximum activation occurred between 3 and 5 in. from the bottom, and that there is some evidence of asymmetry in the thermal neutron distribution, implying an effect of the stainless steel covered concrete floor as a reflector.
If the peak activity is associated with some weighted center of reactivity of the supercritical system, an effective reactor height of 10 in.' is not inconsistent with the assumptions in the above analysis.
No estimate of the energy in the excursion has been made from these values of the steel exposure.
Chemical and radiochemical analyses; energy release
The number of fissions which occurred during the power excursion, and hence the energy release, has been determined from radiochemical analyses of samples of the activated uranium solution.
A sample of limited size was taken from the top of the liquid in the drum about 8 hr after the accident. Since this sample may not have been representative of the entire volume of the solution, a pair of samples was taken about 1 month later from the well-homogenized solution as it was then stored in shielded containers.
It must be pointed out that some dilution of the solution occurred upon transfer from the drum to the storage containers which accounts for differences observed in the specific activities and the solution volumes. This, of course, in no way invalidates the method, provided the volume is measured at the time of sampling.
From 14.0 g of U235 per 1. pie II, taken 1 month after accident:
9.6 g of U235 per 1. pie III, taken 1 month after accident:
9.6 g of U235 per 1. 3 After several hours growth in separated barium. ** The P+ beta particles were measured through an aluminum absorber (104 mg/cms) used to reduce the Ce beta particles. The presence of this absorber necessitated a 48 per cent correction to obtain the Prra4 beta yield. volumes of liquids as they were added separately to a somewhat complex system of piping, partly mixed therein, and finally drained into the 55 gal drum in a stream of variable uranium concentration.
An aqueous solution of cadmium nitrate, adjusted in concentration to approximate the fluid properties of the mislocated uranium solution, together with the volume of water believed appropriate, were used in these tests. Flow rates into the drum were measured and frequent samples were obtained both from the top of the liquid in the drum and from the line as the drum was filled. Although, in principle, the analyses of these samples allow an estimation of the uranium inventory and concentration in the drum as a function of time, it is not certain they are truly representative of the conditions in the drum at the time of the accident. This uncertainty may be due, for example, to irreproducible mixing conditions, particularly since the first emission of nucIear energy caused at Ieast IocaI turbulence.
The fill rate was used in the above reactivity analysis, but it has not been possible to correlate the time-uranium inventory data with the uranium concentrations required for criticality. , yields and the elapseh time between the excursion and the analysis, the number of fissions which occurred per unit volume bf the solution was obtained.
All of the analytical results and a weighted "best value" of the energy released in the excursion, 2.6 x 1020 MeV frdm 1.3 x lOla fissions, are given in Tables 3 and 4 .
It will be noted that large discrepancies exist in the data of Table 3 . A partial eliplanation lies in the existence of noble-gas precursors of most of the nuclides measured in the analysis. A list of these precursors is given in Table 5 . Gases of longer half-lives obviously have higher escape probabilities from the liquid than those of short half-lives.
Further confirmation of this explanation is obtained from observations on samples of solutions in which the fission concentrations have varied; the difference between the fission concentration values derived from Ba13g and Mo99 increases with increasing concentration, i.e. increasing heat output. The apparently low values of the fission concentration in the latter sample, based on Zr.g5 and Ba14O, reported in Table 3 , may be explained by the well-known hydrolytic behavior of zirconium and possible similar loss of barium due to traces of sulfate (in addition to the loss of 16 see Xe140). Disagreements between values from Ce141 and Ce144 have not been explained.
Hydraulic reconstruction experiments
Considerable effort was expended in attempts to reconstruct the flow patterns of the several General observations There are two additional observations which should be recorded for consideration.
One of them is the absence of a strong ambient neutron field at the scene of the accident (the most likely source being the O(M, n)Ne reaction between the U234 u-particles and the oxygen in the water) and, as a consequence, the system may have been above delayed critical before the power level increased from zero.
The second observation is that there was no evidence of the rapid production of large quantities of gas or vapor. There was, for, example, no liquid on the floor under or adjacent to the drum, nor was there an inordinate amount of localized fission product contamination on the fill tube (see Fig. I ) except where it was in contact with the liquid. The nature of the process in the area precIuded any meaningful cc-particle contamination survey for dispersed uranium. These observations minimize any assumption of vigorous boiling of the solution.
There is no clear explanation of why the solution was not dispersed outside the drum, although speculation can relate the violence of the turbulence to the rate and mode of the approach to critical, to the characteristics of the first power surge, and possibly, to the geometry of the vessel. Comparison of experiences with other critical accidents(l) with solutions shows that large as well as insignificant discharges of liquid have been observed in events with the same energy release. critical before any energy was emitted.
O&e started, however, the power level rose quite rapidly to a high value. The energy from these fissions produced gases by dissociation,'") reducing the density and driving the solution subcritical.
Exit of these gas bubbles once more made the system prompt critical and, with the delayed neutrons as a source, the power level again rose. have not allowed an evaluation of the peak power. The potential personnel hazard from the ionizing radiation generated in the observed number of fissions is developed elsewhere in this series of papers and is compared with the exposures experienced by employees in the vicinity of the accident.
As pointed out earlier, it is impossible to reconstruct the reactivity-time pattern and there are, no doubt, several combinations of events which can account for the observations. It is intended to outline very briefly here one possible sequence.
With reference to the power-level relation, indicated by the radiation monitor record described in Fig. 4 , the following sequence of conditions is suggested.
In the absence of a source of neutrons, this system was prompt finally ensued, causing a sharp decrease in density and a concomitant return to subcritical indicated by the decrease in the instrument deflection to about scale reading "20," (Fig. 4) . Following this steep descent, the system settled into an equilibrium condition somewhere in the dclayccl critical range where it was controlled for about 18 min by vapor formation and, to a lesser extent, by decomposition gases. The system remained delayed critical until the inflow of water reduced the concentration to a final subcritical value.
In previous experiences with, accidental critical assemblies,(l) which have been limited to a single burst by some reactor shutdown mechanism, the energy release has been from lOI to IO17 fissions, a not unreasonable estimate of the first of the several pulses in this case.
It is appropriate to consider, briefly, other courses the reaction may have taken and the consequences which could have resulted.
For example, one shutdown mechanism for a supercritical solution, alternate to a dilution, is the removal of sufficient water to increase the chemical concentration beyond that which will support a nuclear chain reaction under the other existing conditions. This removal would be by dissociation and vaporization. In this particular instance, the above analysis shows (Fig. 2) Another shutdown mechanism is a dispersal of the fissionable material, the causes of which are difficult to predict from past experience.
It is believed that the incident described here is a point of departure for predicting the causes and effects of possible future accidents.
It does not set an upper limit to the consequence to be expected for, as pointed out above, there were associated with it a number of unique, fortunate circumstances which reduced the problem significantly.
A study of this type of accident has been made,@) which is supported in part by the findings reported here, and which, in the absence of externally applied shutdown mechanisms, predicts much more severe results.
